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Some Reflections on Women and the Judiciary
The Honorable Rosalie E. Wahl*
Women in this and preceding generations have struggled, in
their private lives and in their professional and public lives, to
have the talents of women and the contributions of women to the
body politic accepted and valued. They have struggled to achieve
power and to use that power to redress injustice and to create an
environment in which all can live freely and fully, without fear or
want. The struggle never ends. If women falter in their efforts, if
they pause to regain strength, if the many dimensions of their lives
distract them for the moment, the pervasive sexism of our social
institutions sweeps like an incoming tide over the field of their en-
deavors, erasing all evidence of progress. Even though women are
equal before the law as regards most responsibilities and burdens,
bigotry persists, sometimes covert and disguised.
The truth is, despite proclamations of equality, the lives of
many women today are impoverished, sometimes violent, and most
often marginal in terms of participation, power, and self-determi-
nation. The poor in this country are disproportionately women-
old women and younger women with children. Women in the
workforce earn sixty cents for every dollar earned by men.1 Wo-
men, many of whom are the sole support of their families, hold
most part-time, low-paying jobs,2 without benefits or security. The
truth is also, however, that women in greater numbers than ever
before are entering business, government, and the professions. 3
Yet even at the top, women are at the bottom. A 1984 study com-
missioned by Minnesota Women Lawyers, Inc. reveals that women
who graduated from law school between 1975 and 1981 had a me-
dian 1982 employment income of $26,810, while the median 1982
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1. Report of the Comm'n on the Economic Status of Women, Women in Min-
nesota 19 (1984).
2. Id. at 15-16, 19-21.
3. In law, for instance, between 1965 and 1976, while the student population in
accredited law schools nearly doubled (from about 60,000 to over 117,000), the
number of women in law school increased 1,200% (from about 2,500 to 30,000).
Spangler, Gordon & Pipkin, Token Women: An Empirical Test of Kanter's Hypoth-
esis, Draft, Am. B. Foundation (1977).
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employment income for men who graduated from law school be-
tween those years was $33,410, with Minnesota women attorneys
earning 80% as much as men.4
For change to occur in this basic inequity of power, we must
challenge the belief that the imbalance is somehow right, natural,
or unavoidable. Gender-based stereotypes, myths, and biases must
be eliminated in every American social institution and profession,
with the judiciary an important priority. According to sociologist
Norma Juliet Wilder, as a result of the movement for women's
rights, most institutions have been forced to undergo critical self-
evaluation of the sexism embedded in the structural features of
their institutions and manifest in the attitudes of the individuals
who participate in them. 5 We have come face-to-face and are grap-
pling with institutional sexism, a term describing "a society in
which all the major institutions discriminate on the same basis and
to the same degree because of shared beliefs about the inferiority
or difference of women." 6 It is a self-reinforcing system. "Barriers
in one organization reinforce barriers in other organizations; and
the male club is the linchpin of the system."7 Political scientist
Beverly Blair Cook describes this network of discriminatory orga-
nizations by listing the percentage of women presidents, directors,
senior partners, trustees, cabinet officers, and other top officials in
the ten most important socioeconomic sectors in our country in
1980: military, 00.0%; investments, 00.9%; insurance, 01.1%; law,
01.8%; banking, 02.3%; industry, 02.4%; utilities, 04.3%; mass me-
dia, 06.8%; government, 07.7%; university, 10.6%.8 Cook notes the
institutions with the most financial, coercive, and legal power have
the smallest percentage of women, but in every socioeconomic sec-
tor, the percentage of women is within the boundaries of tokenism.
By Rosabeth Moss Kanter's measure of tokenism-less than 20%
of one sex 9-women judges in the country provide only token rep-
resentation in the vital process of dispersing justice in a population
composed of 51% women. Any lasting change in the position of
women in our society will be reflected in greater numbers of wo-
4. Leslie Gerstman, The Status of Women in the Legal Profession: A Profile of
Minnesota Attorneys, in A Report Commissioned by Minnesota Women Lawyers,
Inc. 20 (June 1984).
5. Norma Juliet Wikler, On the Judicial Agenda for the 80s: Equal Treatment
for Men and Women in the Courts, 64 Judicature 202, 203 (1980).
6. Beverly Blair Cook, Sex Discrimination in Politics and the All-Male Club,
Paper Presented to Symposium for Women Judges, sponsored by Nat'l Center for
State Courts (April 16, 1982).
7. Id.
8. Id. This proportion is double the 1970 statistics, except for the military.
9. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Reflections on Women and the Legal Profession: A
Sociological Perspective, 1 Harv. Women's L.J. 1, 10 (1978).
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men beyond the level of tokenism in the judiciary and in the legal
profession.
The judiciary, which is called on to determine the effective-
ness of other social institutions in eliminating sex discrimination,
is only now beginning to examine its own sex bias and under-
representation of women. Much of that self-critique results from
the efforts of women judges. Even so, sociologist Wilder has
found, "there is overwhelming evidence that gender-based stereo-
types, biases and myths are embedded in the law itself and in the
attitudes, values and beliefs of some of those who serve as
judges."'10 In fact, the research of Professors Johnston and Knapp
indicate that, with certain notable exceptions, American judges
"have failed to bring to sex discrimination cases those judicial vir-
tues of detachment, reflection and critical analysis which have
served them so well with respect to other sensitive social issues.""1
With regard to race, for instance, judges, at least in their opinions,
"exhibit a conscious attempt to free themselves from habits of
stereotypical thought."12 Not so in the area of sex discrimination,
these researchers conclude. After analyzing a wide variety of cases
dealing with the subject, Johnston and Knapp state "[s]exism-the
making of unjustified (or at least unsupported) assumptions about
individual capabilities, goals and social roles solely on the basis of
sex differences-is as easily discernible in contemporary judicial
opinions as racism ever was."' 3
How will women judges make a difference? Many have
asked whether a vote based on the sex of a prospective judge is a
better guarantee of performance than a vote based on other fac-
tors. On the basis of her research, Cook assures us that, during
this period when gender identity still has tremendous cultural sali-
ence, "women voters can vote for women judicial candidates with
as much profit as men have voted party. And women's organiza-
tions can continue to encourage and support women with feminist
attitudes and records, with a high probability of getting egalitarian
public decisions for women from the bench."14
Women in the judiciary still have the exhilarating sense of
making history. On October 3, 1977, I became the seventy-second
10. Wikler, supra note 5, at 203.
11. John D. Johnston & Charles L. Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A
Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675, 676 (1971).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Beverly Blair Cook, Will Women Judges Make a Difference in Women's
Legal Rights?: A Prediction from Attitudes and Simulated Behavior, in Women.
Power, and Political Systems 216, 237 (Margherita Rendel ed. 1981).
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justice and the first woman to serve on the Minnesota Supreme
Court. This opportunity opened because the women in Minnesota
had become sufficiently organized and sufficiently powerful to say
to a governor, "Nine-zip won't do it." Women have learned the
hard way that those holding power never share it until it becomes
politically necessary to do so. In 1982, Justice M. Jeanne Coyne
made Minnesota the first state in the union with two women on its
highest court. Three members of our state's twelve-member court
of appeals are women-Susanne Sedgwick, Harriet Lansing, and
Doris Huspeni--and an increasing number of women sit on the
trial bench, though still only twenty-one out of 234 state trial court
judges in Minnesota are female. The pool of women lawyers quali-
fied or qualifying for judicial appointment increases yearly, and
best of all, perhaps, the horizons of girl children are expanding. It
is exciting to open the newspaper and find a girl like Hilary in our
local comic strip, "Sally Forth," who, at Halloween, is admiring
her costume of black robe in the mirror. She says to her mother,
who holds a witch's hat in her lap, "Oh put away the hat, I'll just
go as a Supreme Court Justice."
Such evidence of increased participation is sweet, even
though what I and others have experienced as dramatic leaps
ahead are, in a larger perspective, only the slow erosion of individ-
ual and institutional sexism. How can women judges make our in-
creased participation most meaningful to the interests of other
women and of our society? Now that enough women are in the
bar and on the bench to form a mass, a critical mass, large enough
to be a catalyst, what are our responsibilities for change? Women
with access to power and status must not allow this to separate
them from their knowledge of what it means to be female in this
society. Certainly every woman of accomplishment owes it to an-
other woman to reach out and assist her growth and aspiration.
We are responsible, socially and individually, for helping other wo-
men achieve their desired goals. Thus, in our own sphere, we
work for the election or appointment of women judges to the
bench. Once there, we expect and anticipate women judges will
fulfill expectations of judicial excellence.
We also have a right to expect from women judges an intense
commitment to fairness, growing out of a personal recognition of
the injury of injustice and unfairness. We expect, of course, that
women judges will treat men and women fairly; that, in itself, will
have profound effects. Our responsibility is even broader than
gender even-handedness, however. Will we take this sensitivity to
fairness and apply it to all who come before us? Will we transform
our specific knowledge of the shifting social rules and the limiting
[Vol. 4:153
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assumptions about the individual capabilities, interests, and goals
of women into a broad ethic of fairness to all persons whose exis-
tences are controlled by such cultural limits? As judges, will we
challenge ourselves to question how and why some persons are
traditionally considered "bad," incompetent, or unable, and who
and what makes some people more likely to be faulted socially,
and thus legally, for their actions? The old, the poor, the differ-
ently abled, members of racial, ethnic, cultural, and affectional
preference minorities, like women, have all suffered from these as-
sumptions. A comprehensive ethic of fairness requires this
breadth of vision of what equal treatment might mean. As we face
every party who appears before us in our role as judge, whether in
person at a trial or on the record in appellate review, such con-
cerns must be in our minds.
The poet Audre Lourde has given us rich and interesting
words of advice. "[T]he master's tools will never dismantle the
master's house," she warns. "They may allow us temporarily to
beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring
about genuine change."15 On entering what may have been the
master's courthouse and picking up the tools of justice, which also
belong to us, we must work not only at dismantling the injustices
which once excluded us. We must hammer and saw diligently and
with joy to build a home for all.
15. Audre Lourde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's
House, in This Bridge Called My Back: Writings of Radical Women of Color 98, 99
(Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldfia eds. 1981) (emphasis omitted).
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